

Unclassified Paper
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

WHAT ELSE SHOULD OUR MILITARY FORCES BE DOING?
THE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER
THAN WAR

by

Juan Guadalupe Ayala
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the United States Marine Corps or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

16 May, 2000

Faculty Advisor
Professor J. D. Waghelstein
Joint Military Operations Department

DWC QUALITY INSPECTED 4
20000914 031

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): WHAT ELSE SHOULD OUR MILITARY FORCES BE DOING? THE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATING IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (U)			
9. Personal Authors: JUAN GUADALUPE AYALA, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 16 MAY 2000	
12. Page Count: 25		12.A PAPER ADVISOR: PROFESSOR J.D. WAGHELSTEIN	
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, COUNTERDRUGS, LESSONS LEARNED, READINESS, TRAINING			
15. Abstract: The United States is the only remaining super-power in the post-Cold War era. Even without major threat, the U.S. has nevertheless been confronted with a number of difficult situations requiring the use of military forces. Involvement in these Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) raises questions regarding the wisdom of expending political capital, national treasure and human resources in endeavors which supposedly atrophy the readiness and adequacy of U.S. combat capabilities. Moreover, some feel that many of these operations serve no vital national security interests. This paper takes the opposite view and explores the military benefits of participating in MOOTW by illustrating how many of the tasks performed by military units are commensurate to those performed in combat. Due to the immense body of knowledge in this area, only specific elements of operational art, illustrated with vignettes, will be examined. It focuses on strategic lift and command and control in operations in the Balkans and Somalia. Training and Rules of Engagement in U.S. counterdrug operations will also be examined. Finally, the impact and importance of lessons learned and their relevancy to future MOOTW and combat operations will be analyzed.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT.			
19. Telephone: 841-2245		20. Office Symbol: 1	

Abstract

The United States is the only remaining super-power in the post-Cold War era. Even without a major threat, the U.S. has nevertheless been confronted with a number of difficult situations requiring the use of military forces. Involvement in these Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) raises questions regarding the wisdom of expending political capital, national treasure and human resources in endeavors which supposedly atrophy the readiness and adequacy of U.S. combat capabilities. Moreover, some feel that many of these operations serve no vital national security interests. This paper takes the opposite view and explores the military benefits of participating in MOOTW by illustrating how many of the tasks performed by military units are commensurate to those performed in combat. Due to the immense body of knowledge in this area, only specific elements of operational art, illustrated with vignettes, will be examined. It focuses on strategic lift and command and control in operations in the Balkans and Somalia. Training and Rules of Engagement in U.S. counterdrug operations will also be examined. Finally, the impact and importance of lessons learned and their relevancy to future MOOTW and combat operations will be analyzed.

...Our experience in Haiti has reinforced my belief that preparing for war must be the priority for any Army. The key is to understand the complexities of the peace operation environment you are facing and then adapt your warfighting skill to meet them...

LtGen J. W. Kinzer, USA
Force Commander, UN Mission in Haiti¹

Introduction

Participation in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) enhances combat readiness far more than waiting for the "big one" to breakout. Units deployed to contingencies on the lower end of the force spectrum routinely perform many of their core competencies or tasks on their Mission Essential Task List (METL). They learned valuable lessons in; deliberate and crisis action planning, C4I, logistics, Rules of Engagement (ROE), intelligence, integration of the National Guard, reserves, joint, and combined forces, Host Nation Support (HNS), inter-agency coordination, security, small unit tactics, civil affairs, operational law, and even in the conduct of limited combat operations. This does not include intangible factors such as the attainment of experience and confidence commanders and troops gain working in foreign and immature theaters.

While there are drawbacks to participating in MOOTW, the benefits, especially in light of the current interregnum, are far outweighed by the real-world experience gained by the military units who participate in them. One has only to look to history to see that American forces have had a long legacy of participation in these types of operations. U.S. troops have spent a substantial amount of time out of their barracks and homeports performing such unconventional tasks as fighting pirates, quelling domestic rebellions, re-locating American Indians, chasing guerillas in the Philippines and Mexico, guarding the U.S. mail, caring for Vietnamese refugees and airlifting supplies to West Berlin. Given the nature of the world,

this trend will undoubtedly continue. Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) are beginning to articulate and formalize U.S. involvement. As the Commander in Chief (CINC) of U.S. Southern Command stated, "American involvement is essential if we are to maintain our own security, continue to hold a position of world leadership, and be involved in shaping world events,...One of the elements of power is the will to exert it."² The forward presence of American forces is essential to demonstrate commitment, lend credibility to alliances, enhance regional stability and provide a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access.³

Civilian leadership commits military forces. While military leaders do as they are told, senior military leaders, especially CINCs, do exert substantial influence on the political decision-makers, most of who have never been in uniform. Before these combatant commanders write off MOOTW contingencies as distractions from preparations for fighting major wars, several questions must be answered: How can military forces hone their martial skills by staying at home? What else should military forces be doing in peacetime? Are training exercises in the continental U.S. (CONUS) more beneficial than participating in real world, MOOTW deployments? What is the trade-off between realistically exercising a few core competencies vice exercising none? Will participating in MOOTW degrade combat readiness? This piece will attempt to answer some of these questions by highlighting the benefits of MOOTW, not only the Marine Corps, but to the entire U.S. military. This paper does not advocate converting the U.S. military into a peacekeeping force or a heavily armed constabulary. On the contrary, U.S. forces should remain preeminent throughout the

spectrum of war. However, the benefits to the nation and the valuable experience and lessons learned by U.S. forces that execute MOOTW missions should not be minimized.

...The soldiers started to move out of the LZ but they had people around them throwing everything. I grabbed 10 guys and went to help get the five soldiers, one of which was LT. Kasker, who was a long way from the GIC at this point. I got about 15 meters away and saw LT. Kasker get smashed over the head with a huge tree limb that actually broke on his head...At this point I took out my 9mm with the intent on shooting the guy...

Cpt. Dave Detz
CO, 92d MP Co, 2-11th Inf. Reg. Kosovo⁴

Peacekeeping/Enforcement Lessons Learned-Command and Control

Since 1945 more than 800 peacekeepers from 42 nations, including the U.S., have been killed while serving under the UN flag.⁵ This does not include the U.S. casualties suffered in unilateral MOOTW missions. However, U.S. forces have in fact benefited from these operations. Operational lessons learned in Somalia began with command and control. The difficulties facing the American Joint Task Force Commander with a multinational coalition of 20 different countries--all of them with different political agendas, sensitivities, requirements and capabilities, challenged the principle of *unity of command*. "Even more daunting, there were as many as 49 different U.N. and humanitarian relief agencies--none of which was obliged to follow military directives."⁶ In addition, and due to intense international interest, minor tactical decisions had the potential of having operational and even strategic consequences. To facilitate this politically driven morass, a practical span of control was arranged in which brigade-size coalition contingents were given mission-type orders. Smaller contingents were placed under the control of the U.S. service components. Additionally, a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established as the key coordinating point between the military and the 49 different relief agencies. Other important

innovations were the division of the country into several Humanitarian Relief Sectors that accomplished two objectives; the orderly distribution of food and the assignment of military areas of responsibility. Underpinning the relief efforts were the traditional combat missions including; force protection, the manning of quick reaction forces and armed aerial reconnaissance. While many of the troops in-theater were combat troops, a substantial number conducting combat type tasks were logistical or support personnel, giving those troops experience normally not acquired in a conventional conflict.

The lessons learned in command and control during the Somalia operation were not lost. To improve the capability to respond quickly to peace and humanitarian emergencies the U.N., with the help of the U.S.,⁷ is currently developing the *Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters* to avoid many of the systemic command and control problems associated with coalition operations.⁸ The lessons from MOOTW have also spawned new programs within the U.S. military. The Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Richard Danzig, has initiated a new program called the “*Year Out*,” in which promising young officers from the Navy and Marine Corps spend a year in civilian industry, a refugee-aid charity or a business. The Naval services “hope to develop officers better able to operate in the crises of tomorrow, which are expected to be situations akin to Somalia or Bosnia that tend to involve working alongside relief groups, human rights workers and other non-military organizations.”⁹ Other initiatives include aggressive programs, especially by the U.S. Army, to integrate young, bright officers into coalition units as Multinational Force Liaison Officers (MNF LNO). LNOs are chosen for their professional competency and personal characteristics. “They must be thoroughly knowledgeable of their parent unit’s mission and its tactics, techniques and

procedures (TTP), organization, capabilities, and communications equipment.... and must have the sufficient rank and authority to speak for their commander.”¹⁰ They not only speak for their unit; many times they speak for their country. While the use of liaison officers is not new, the coalition militaries that now have Americans on their staffs reflect the lessons learned from peacekeeping operations in the last decade. Bosnia serves as a good example of the growing trend. Currently, American officers (mostly O4s) serve as MNF LNOs with the following brigades; Nordic-Polish, Turkish, Russian Airborne and several other Multi-National organizations consisting of British, Swedish, Greek, Norwegian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian units. Americans will operate in coalitions in the future. As the National Military Strategy specifically states; “...our armed forces will most often fight in concert with regional allies and friends, as coalitions can decisively increase combat power...”¹¹ The lessons learned by today’s young LNOs serving with coalition and allied staffs will bear fruit in the future.

Peacekeeping Lessons Learned-Logistics (Strategic Lift)

Logistics forms the foundation for combat power. Whether in peace, MOOTW, or in war, logisticians are involved in the same basic “process of planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy and operations.”¹² During *Operation Restore Hope* in Somalia, strategic air and sealift assets were taxed as in combat operations. “Nearly 1,000 airlift missions moved over 33,000 passengers and more than 32,000 short tons of cargo. Eleven ships, including fast-sealift vessels, moved 365,000 ‘measurement’ tons of cargo to the theater as well as 1,992 containers of sustainment supply.

And over 14 million gallons of fuel were delivered from Ready Reserve Tankers to the forces ashore.”¹³

Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina also posed vexing challenges. American forces under the aegis of the *Allied Command Europe* mobility coordination center (AMCC) in Mons, Belgium planned and executed lift operations in support of 32 nations to points of debarkation. This complex mission was made even more difficult because the participants included non-governmental organizations, non-NATO nations and, these collective nations’/organizations’ political sensitivities, unique deployment standards and geographical locations. Standardized management tools and movement procedures resulted in the relatively smoothed management, coordination, prioritization, and movement-control of over 2,800 aircraft, 400 trains, and 50 ships. Over 205,000 tons of cargo and 40,000 personnel were eventually deployed into theater. After the mission, an experienced officer wrote, “Valuable lessons learned from the deployment phase of *Operation Joint Endeavor* will assist with the re-deployment of troops...and will help allied forces plan and execute future multinational military operations.”¹⁴

In support of the recent operation in Kosovo, planning for the deployment of 7,000 NATO peacekeeping troops and their equipment was accomplished by soldiers and civilians assigned to several Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) ports throughout Europe. From Greece, thousands of pieces of equipment were deployed by rail, road and sea through Macedonia, to Kosovo. These efforts resulted in the successful deployment of the

peacekeepers, hundreds of pieces of armor, reconnaissance, utility and fighting vehicles, artillery pieces and engineer assets from several NATO nations to the area of operations.

Logistics and command and control are not the only areas from which wartime lessons have been compiled. In the last decade, operational commanders have accomplished their doctrinal task of bridging strategic logistics to tactical logistics while learning valuable lessons in support of MOOTW missions. U.S. Transportation Command's stated mission, "To provide air, land and sea transportation for the DOD, both in time of peace and time of war,"¹⁵ has been accomplished by honing military and civilian logisticians' warfighting core competencies. Lessons learned include; joint/combined logistics planning, integration of civilian and military transportation assets, HNS, asset visibility, Time-Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD) planning, landing support procedures, and logistical intelligence. In command and control, documented lessons from Somalia and the Balkans have ensured future operations will take into account the difficulties encountered when fighting as a coalition, the importance of liaison officers and the numerous multi-agency considerations and demands placed on commanders. These lessons apply across the range of military operations.

As the agents (U.S. Border Patrol {U.S.B.P.}) approached, four subjects bailed out of the vehicle and opened fire. The five Marines observed the exchange of gunfire and determined that the agents lives were in immediate danger and returned fire...The patrol had received fire from a position north west of the landing. The team did not return fire because the exact position of the subjects was not known.

Mission Commander, 2nd SRIG, USMC
JT 323-93 (JTF-6), McAllen, Texas¹⁶

Lessons Learned-Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Counterdrug (CD) Operations

In September of 1989 then Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney designated drug trafficking a threat to U.S. national security. In support of the National Drug Control Strategy, the Secretary decreed that "...DOD will assist requesting Law Enforcement agencies (LEA) and the National Guard with training, reconnaissance, command and control, planning, and logistics for counter drug operations. In appropriate cases, armed forces and personnel will be detailed directly to law enforcement agencies to assist in the fight..."¹⁷

Tasks assigned to military units were to equate to wartime requirements which included: 1) aviation and ground reconnaissance, 2) unmanned aerial vehicle operations, 3) intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 4) intelligence analysis, 5) Special Reaction Team operations, 6) dive operations, 7) horizontal/vertical construction, 8) ground surveillance radar, 9) sensor operations, 10) interrogations, and 11) listening post/observation post (LP/OP) operations.

With this mandate, Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) was created adding military muscle to the nation's *War on Drugs*.

By law, all JTF-6 missions must have training value. Both units and individuals benefit because they operate and train against a real world, flexible and sophisticated enemy who wants to succeed.¹⁸ Moreover, all units, regardless of assigned mission receive (along with

other training), extensive ROE situational training by the JTF-6 staff. It is important to emphasize that the forces conducting these missions are not operating in a foreign country, but on U.S. sovereign territory--many times in the immediate proximity of the Mexican border. This border, which is over 2,000 contiguous miles long and not always clearly marked, straddles a country that is inherently distrustful of U.S. intentions and has always been hyper-sensitive to any military presence by its super-power neighbor. In addition, U.S. citizens have traditionally been suspicious of U.S. forces operating on their lands. Exacerbating this are operational restrictions imposed by the *Posse Comitatus Act* which prohibits active duty military (Title 10) forces from routinely searching, seizing, arresting or conducting any related law enforcement activity involving civilians.¹⁹ Finally, one must address the capabilities and sophistication of the drug traffickers (threat). Intelligence has proven that drug organizations are difficult to identify, well armed, employ modern communications and night vision equipment, and are adept at using locals to transport and distribute drugs via remote avenues of approach into the U.S.

Military personnel supporting LEAs under operational control of JTF-6 must abide by JCS peacetime ROE. They may only use their issued weapons for self-defense but "may return fire when threatened with deadly force or to defend themselves, accompanying LEA agents or others present."²⁰ Although CD missions in CONUS have been relatively uneventful, on at least four occasions there have been exchanges of gunfire resulting in military and civilian casualties.²¹ In one instance, a Marine unit monitoring previously implanted ground sensors reported vehicle movement along a high drug trafficking area in McAllen, Texas. The Marines reported the detection to their supported LEA (U.S.B.P.).

When the agents responded to the scene, they were met by gunfire from a group of drug smugglers. From a distance, the Marine leader assessed that the agents were in grave peril and, on his own initiative, ordered his unit to return fire in support of the agents. When the firefight was over (approximately 120 shots later) both the agents and the Marines walked away unscathed. The shaken agents nabbed a suspect, two vehicles and a ton of marijuana.

In a second incident, a different Marine unit was conducting an LP/OP mission in search of drug traffickers in Redford, a small city in a remote part of south Texas. A civilian allegedly shot at the Marines on at least two occasions alarming the Marines, but not to the point of retaliation. Again, the Marine leader assessed the situation; however in this case, he decided to seek instructions from his chain of command. The Marine Non-Commissioned Officer was instructed to "follow the ROE." When the civilian raised his weapon in a threatening manner for a third time in the direction of the Marines, he was shot dead.

In both of these incidents there is a high probability that lives were saved. The actions of both units were thoroughly scrutinized afterwards and the Marine decision-makers within those units' chains of command were investigated. The Redford incident, although a small tactical action, received international attention. The Marine who fired the fatal shot faced prosecution from civilian courts but was eventually exonerated. "...Seven separate legal standards, State and Federal Grand Juries, investigations by the Department of Justice and JTF-6, and the investigation's own ROE expert have determined that the standing ROE and civil rules regarding use of force were followed..."²² The McAllen incident occurred so close to the Mexican border that the drug traffickers used the Rio Grande to flee on rafts.

The Marines reported receiving over 40 rounds--including some from the Mexican side of the border. Yet, under strict compliance with ROE, they did not return fire indiscriminately because "...the exact position of the subjects was not known..."²³ The restraint and proficiency both units displayed attest to the benefits of ROE training and how these procedures are realistically exercised in MOOTW missions--even if these missions are conducted in CONUS. Strategically, these were minor incidents. However, to those in the line of fire and their commanders, their actions (taken under the duress of small arms fire) required decisive judgement. More importantly, these thorny dilemmas replicate tactical level combat and are the kind of situations that will undoubtedly confront U.S. forces in the future.

Lessons Learned-Training for CD Operations

DOD's fiscal year 1999 budget request to support U.S. drug interdiction efforts totaled \$882.8 million.²⁴ Are military units, and the nation, getting their money's worth? Using CONUS based JTF-6 missions as a measure, the answer is a definite yes. While military units do not gauge their effectiveness by the number of drugs interdicted or the number of smugglers apprehended, their effectiveness is measured by how well they meet their supported LEAs' objectives and by the value of training received. It must also be noted that JTF-6 relies on volunteers for all its missions and units requesting repeat taskings are common, attesting to the value of training and experience received. Virtually every type of military unit has participated in CD missions under the operational control of JTF-6. Units from throughout CONUS, to include Hawaii, have performed missions running the operational and logistical gamut. Numerous combat arms units have deployed to the

Southwest Border and conducted operational missions and training in a large percentage of their wartime tasks. The value of this training can best be described by the previously discussed CD missions in Texas and by the comments found in many JTF-6 After-Action Reports (AAR). Typical of these comments are those from a battalion of the 82d Airborne Division stating:

...The Task Force approached Operation GREENSTALK as an opportunity to train for LIC. The entire operation, from deployment to a vast unknown area, search for an illusive enemy (marijuana plant and growers), unfamiliar maps (non-standard military maps), immature logistical support base, and the ROE to uncertainty of reaction from the local populous (hostile, supportive or apathetic) set the stage for great LIC training.²⁵

While the previous examples cited have been of Army and Marine units, the make-up of participants is definitely "Joint." Special Operations Forces' aviation units have flown hundreds of thousands of hours in support of CD missions. They have conducted day and night reconnaissance missions identifying numerous drug smuggling routes and drug growing areas along the international boundary, and in the National Forests. Air Force units have transported everything from mission equipment and personnel to trial evidence and smuggling suspects. Army Special Forces have provided Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to LEAs teaching basic and advanced military skills, as they would to foreign armies. Navy Seal Teams have conducted ground surveillance, reconnaissance and dive support along the waterways of JTF-6's area of operations.

Currently, and due to the Redford, Texas incident,²⁶ engineer missions make up the bulk of active CD operations at JTF-6. Engineer units from all four services, the reserves and numerous State National Guards have been actively engaged in various construction and

lighting projects along the international boundary. Thousands of miles of roads and fencing (to deter smugglers) have been repaired and constructed while large swaths of the U.S./Mexican border have had lighting and barriers installed. In California alone, (and in the spirit of the 'total force') Navy Amphibious Construction Battalions, National Guardsmen from California, Missouri, Texas, South Carolina, Massachusetts and Connecticut, and reserve Marines, airmen and soldiers have participated in numerous engineer projects since 1991.²⁷ Today, Air Force, Army, Marine and Army reserve units are involved in a major project constructing roads and bridges in the states of New Mexico and Texas. All units are conducting their METL tasks and are deploying via strategic air and long distance line haul. They have established base camps in remote areas and are self-sustaining. This half-million dollar project will eventually result in miles of improved roads and new bridges, an LEA better prepared to deter drug traffickers, and core competent military units.²⁸

The amount of realistic training accomplished during CD missions cannot be adequately covered here. Lessons learned from working with civilian LEAs are applicable to coalitions and non-governmental agencies (NGO) in such areas as command and control, civil-military relations, interagency planning/training, Law of Armed Conflict (ROE), communications interoperability, intelligence and media relations. Sheer numbers are the best proof of the value of CD missions. Since JTF-6's inception, units from all four services and numerous states' National Guards have completed over 4,300 missions in support of more than 300 federal, state, and local LEAs and CD task forces. The experience gained and lessons learned by commanders and their troops have included over 25 different peace and wartime skills.

...We cannot let drifting foreign policy get in the way of some hard soul-searching. We must address the effects that peacekeeping missions and other nonwarfighting tasks have on readiness. The impact is significant, and we need to ask ourselves some tough questions...

Reserve Major, U.S. Army²⁹

Counterarguments

Although the above quote is gratuitously political, it reflects a view held by some senior military officers and members of Congress. "Our troops are overextended and operating at levels that simply cannot be sustained over time...",³⁰ laments a Congressman from South Carolina whose argument is not without merit. In 1994 three Army divisions,³¹ and in 1999 two Army divisions, reported very low C-Ratings on their Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) Report due, along with other reasons, to participation in MOOTW missions.³² In addition, all services with the exception of the Marines, are currently struggling with both recruitment and retention. Maintenance problems, such as those recently found on the *Apache* attack helicopters, and high operational tempos have all been cited as reasons for decreased readiness. Moreover, several generals participating in a study researching foreign policy issues warned that MOOTW operations harm military readiness by consuming resources earmarked for combat training. More ominously, some MOOTW critics feel that these operations "soften" service members and attract less warrior-like persons to the military. Broad generalizations have also been penned claiming that, "Interventionary operations require a mindset at odds with warfighting,"³³ and, "...nurturing and fighting are not easily compatible."³⁴

While all these arguments have merit, they do not prove that MOOTW operations cause the combat capability of combat forces to atrophy. The ones who would know the most about the issue, the military, are not convinced either. After both the 1995 and 1999 SORTS Reports that highlighted the Army divisions' low readiness ratings appeared in the national press, high-ranking officials in DOD published statements mitigating their impact. In 1995 ADM. W.A. Owens' position stated; "...The readiness of our 'first-to-fight' forces to execute the requirement of two major regional contingencies occurring nearly simultaneously remains high..."³⁵ He further went on to water down the impact of the SORTS report by stating that the report was only a "...current snapshot on a select slice of readiness information...That there are many things SORTS does not directly measure...SORTS does not measure future readiness; it is not predictive."³⁶ In 1999 the Secretary of Defense, W.S. Cohen, stated that; "All our forward-deployed forces still are in a very high state of readiness, the highest because they are the ones who may be called upon to go into battle."³⁷

At the operational and tactical level, the sentiments are much the same. Many senior officers do concede that MOOTW operations can hurt readiness, especially if these missions are allowed to take priority over combat training. However, they also state that these missions provide real world experience in chaotic, post-Cold War hot spots. Many units who have participated in JTF-6 missions have documented in post-exercise AARs that; "CD missions were the best training they had ever received." Large numbers of military units have consistently volunteered and been assigned CD missions. Just one LEA, the U.S.B.P., and the military have collaborated on approximately 160 yearly missions since 1990.³⁸ The 1st Marine Division alone has conducted approximately 119 CD missions since fiscal year 93

and its units have been fired upon in approximately 5% of these missions.³⁹ In a recent study by a bi-partisan, non-profit organization that researches foreign policy issues, such notables as Generals Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Charles Krulak, several Congressmen, and eleven active duty generals, to include Army and Division commanders and CINCs, challenged the argument that participation in MOOTW reduces overall military readiness. Examples of comments included; from the 1st U.S. Army commander after returning from Haiti, "they were generally a better force for having completed such missions if...there is time to recover." The 1st Armored Division commander stated, "The Division was a much better division when we came back from Bosnia than when we went." Retired Army Gen. and former NATO commander George Joulwan stated, "The assumption that the military exists solely to fight 'the big one' means we are strategically irrelevant...You are not shaping the environment. You're sitting there waiting for the big one to start." Last, but certainly not least, Gen. Schwarzkopf said flatly, "These deployments, in fact, help morale."⁴⁰

The argument that peacekeeping duty makes individuals less warrior-like is not only unproven, but has been refuted by a 1996 Army study. The study found no evidence to support the suggestion that peacekeeping duties affect the ability of soldiers to subsequently serve as war fighters.⁴¹ Finally, current social and economic factors cannot fairly be excluded from these arguments. The strongest U.S. economy in decades and a shrinking enlistment-aged population base have taken their toll on recruitment and retention. Depending on their political bent, civilian leaders will interpret raw readiness numbers in a variety of ways. Hopefully for the military, the impact of politics will be a positive one.

Conclusion

I have attempted to analyze a few examples of MOOTW tasks and highlight their relevance to conventional war. There are many others. However, the question remains: What else should our military forces be doing? I argue that operational commanders should seek opportunities to participate in MOOTW because of the valuable lessons learned. I believe that the forces that deployed to Kosovo, Somalia and the Mexican Border learned more realistic, valuable lessons than those who went on annual deployments to the National Training Center, 29 Palms, California or Fallon, Nevada.

History is replete with examples of world powers that remained preeminent because their national interests were supported by their militaries. Involvement and presence helped them shape international events and maintain national security. MOOTW operations support the National Security Strategy and its stated purpose to *Shape, Respond* and *Prepare*. The presence of our military forces, whether in MOOTW or in war, overseas or in CONUS, advances our interests, provides invaluable experience and abets the training of commanders and troops. I cannot think of a single example of a nation that retained its position as a world leader with a policy of military isolation. The fact that there aren't large conventional wars looming on the horizon is irrelevant. The reality is that for the next several years, MOOTW will be *the only game in town*. We should continue to train for conventional war but seek opportunities to play on the MOOTW stage. Our troops should be flexible warriors able to adapt to MOOTW. The lessons learned from these operations will be invaluable in a future conflict. Our military forces and our nation must make the most of these opportunities.

Notes

¹ Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, Virginia, 16 June 1997), i.

² John Diamond, "Military commanders praise U.S. peacekeeping operations," Associated Press, 6 July 1999, 1-3.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1995), I-4.

⁴ Sweeney, Patrick, <sweeney@nwc.navy.mil> "92 Tracker" 5 April 2000. Office Communication. (14 April 2000).

⁵ Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington: National Defense University Press. Institute for National Strategic Studies 1995), 4.

⁶ Ibid., 23

⁷ I mention the UN because the U.S. plays a key role in assessing the need for each new peacekeeping operation and all decisions made once a mission starts. Because the U.S. has veto power on the Security Council, a UN peacekeeping operation cannot be authorized without U.S. support. Any new initiative by the UN, especially involving military operations, is a de-facto U.S. initiative that will affect the conduct of operations by U.S. forces.

⁸ Nancy Soderberg, "UN Peacekeeping Lessons Learned, Progress Achieved." USIA, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, April 1998.

<<http://www.usia.gov/journals/itps/0498/ijpe/pj28sode.htm>> (23 March 00).

⁹ Thomas E. Ricks. "For Marines, A Major Time Out," The Washington Post, 23 March 2000, p. 27.

¹⁰ Kenneth O. Merkel, "Multinational Force Liaison Officers in Bosnia: How Do I Sign Up? Center For Army Lessons Learned, Ft. Leavenworth KS. March 1999.

<<http://call.army.mil/calltrngqtr/tq3-99/merkel.htm>> (2 April 2000).

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1995), VI-I.

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, (Joint Pub 4-0) (Washington D.C.: January 27, 1995), I-1.

¹³ Allard, 45

¹⁴ Nicholas J. Anderson, "Multinational Deployments in Operation Joint Endeavor," Army Logistician, Nov-Dec 96, 3.

¹⁵ United States Transportation Command, Handbook 24-1 (Scott AFB, Illinois, 1998), 1.

¹⁶ Mission Commander, 2d Sensor Control Management Platoon, 2nd SRIG, II MEF, JT Mission 323-93 to the Commanding General, JTF-6, 12 March 1993, "After Action Report From Sensor Patrol conducted 11 March 1993," Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

¹⁷ Joint Task Force Six Official Website. Joint Task Force Six. 3 December, 1999.

<<http://www-jtf6.bliss.army.mil/html/mission/html>> (18 April 2000).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ "United States Code of Federal Regulations," Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus. (Washington: U.S. General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Office of the Federal Register, 1 April 2000), Title 18, Section 1835.

²⁰ Joint Task Force Six, Operational Support Planning Guide: Concept of Military Support. (Ft. Bliss, Texas, 1993), 3

²¹ Dunn, Timothy. "Military collaboration with the Border Patrol in the U.S.-Mexico region: Inter-organizational relations and human rights implications." The Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Winter, 1999. Naval War College Library/Wires. Merlin. (22 April 2000)

- ²² MGEN John H. Admire to Commanding General, I MEF, 17 APRIL 1998, "Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the Joint Task Force Six shooting incident that occurred on 30 May 1997 near the border between the United States and Mexico," Camp Pendleton, California.
- ²³ Handbook 24-1, 2.
- ²⁴ "Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony" DOD Counterdrug Activities: Reported Costs Do Not Reflect Extent of DOD's Support., 23 September 1998.
<<http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY98/abstracts/ns98231.htm>> (22 April, 2000).
- ²⁵ Joint Task Force Six, After-Action Report from 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division, JT Mission 237-91. (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1991).
- ²⁶ Shortly after the Redford incident, the Pentagon announced that it was suspending further use of ground troops along the Mexican border pending an internal review of this practice. Other forms or assistance would, however, continue. In addition, Pentagon officials announced that they would be reviewing ways to protect troops who followed ROE from facing prosecution in civilian courts. Since this incident over 600 missions have been conducted by JTF-6.
- ²⁷ Hunter, Duncan. "Fence, Lights, Border Patrol," Congressman Duncan Hunter's Efforts to Secure the Border. 12 May 1999.
<<http://www.house.gov/hunter/brdrchron.htm>> (30 September 1999).
- ²⁸ Mahaffey, Patrick, <Patrick.Mahaffey@jtf6.bliss.army.mil> "Request for Information." 19 April 2000. Office Communication. (19 April 2000).
- ²⁹ Mark L. Kimmey, "After the Deployment:: The Impact of Peacekeeping on Readiness," Army Magazine, August, 1999, 1-2.
- ³⁰ Diamond, 1-3.
- ³¹ "Joint Command Readiness: Requirements and Concerns," American Forces Information Service. Defense Viewpoint. Volume 10, Number 29. 9 March 1995.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/di1029.html>> (24 April 2000).
- ³² Linda D. Kozaryn, "Cohen Addresses Readiness News," American Forces Information Service. News Articles. 23 November, 1999.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1999/n11231999_9911232.html> (24 April 2000).
- ³³ Wray R. Johnson, "Warriors Without a War: Defending MOOTW," Military Review, Dec 1998-Feb 99, 68-74.
- ³⁴ Andrew S. Natsios, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse—Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies (Westport CT.: Praeger, 1997), 111-112.
- ³⁵ Diamond, 1-3.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Dunn, 7.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 8.
- ⁴⁰ Diamond, 3.
- ⁴¹ David Segal and Dana P. Eyre, "U.S. Army in Peace Operations at the Dawning of the Twenty-First Century," (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA: 1996), 52.

Bibliography

- "Abstracts of GAO Reports and Testimony," DOD Counterdrug Activities: Reported Costs Do Not Reflect Extent of DOD's Support. 23 September 1998.
<<http://www.gao.gov/AIndexFY98/abstracts/ns98231.htm>> (22 April 2000).
- Admire, J. H. MGEN. to Commanding General, I MEF. 17 APRIL 1998. "Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the Joint Task Force Six shooting incident that occurred on 30 May 1997 near the border between the United States and Mexico." Camp Pendleton, California.
- Allard, Kenneth. "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned." National Defense University Press, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C.: 1995.
- Anderson, Nicholas J. Col. USA, "Multinational Deployments in Operation Joint Endeavor." Army Logistician, Nov-Dec. 96.
- Code of Federal Regulations--Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus. Washington: U.S. General Services Administration. National Archives and Records Service. Office of the Federal Register, 1 April 2000.
- Diamond, John, "Military Commanders praise U.S. peacekeeping operations," Associated Press, 6 July 1999, 1-3.
- Dunn, Timothy. "Military collaboration with the Border Patrol in the U.S.-Mexico region: Inter-organizational relations and human rights implications." The Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Winter, 1999. Naval War College Library/Wires. Merlin. (22 April 2000).
- Grimmett, Richard F., "Multinational Peacekeeping Operations: Proposals to Enhance Congressional Oversight" Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. 25 November 1996.
<<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-006.htm>> (March 00).
- Johnson, Wray R. "Warriors Without a War: Defending OOTW." Military Review, Dec 1998-Feb 1999, 68-74.
- "Joint Command Readiness: Requirements and Concerns," American Forces Information Service. Defense. Volume 10, Number 29. 9 March 1995.
<<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/dil1029.html>> (24 April 2000).
- Joint Task Force Six Official Website. Joint Task Force Six. 3 December, 1999.
<<http://www-jtf6.bliss.army.mil/html/mission/html>> (18 April 2000).

Joint Task Force Six, Operational Support Planning Guide: Concept of Military Support. (Ft. Bliss, Texas, 1993).

Joint Warfighting Center. Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Ft. Monroe: JWC, 16 June 1997.

Kimmey, Mark L., "After the Deployment: The Impact of Peacekeeping on Readiness." Army Magazine, August 1999.

Kozaryn, Linda D. "Cohen Addresses Readiness News," American Forces Information Service. News Articles. 23 November 1999.
>http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1999/n11231999_9911232.html> (24 April 2000).

Merkel, Kenneth O. "Multinational Force Liaison Officers in Bosnia: How Do I Sign Up?" Center For Army Lessons Learned, Ft. Leavenworth KS. March 1999.
<<http://call.army.mil/calltrngqtr/tq3-99/merkel.htm>> (2 April, 2000).

Mission Commander, 2nd Sensor Control Management Platoon, 2nd SRIG, II MEF, JT Mission 323-93 to Commanding General, JTF-6 12 March, 1993, "After Action Report From Sensor Patrol conducted 11 March 1993." Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

Natsios, Andrew S. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse-Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies. Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1997.

Randt, John, R. "Land the Kosovo Force." Army Logistician, Jan-Feb 00.

Rice, Anthony, J. "Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare." Parameters, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, Spring 1997, 153.

Ricks, Thomas E., "For Marines, A Major Time Out." Washington Post, 23 March 2000, pg. 27.

Soderberg, Nancy. "UN Peacekeeping Builds on Lessons Learned, Progress Achieved." USIA, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda. April 1998.
<<http://www.usia.gov/journals/itps/0498/ijpe/pj28sode.htm>> (23 March 00).

Sweeney, Patrick, <SMPTP:detzd@monteith2.aurer.army.mil> "92d Tracker," 5 April 2000. Office Communication. (14 April 2000).

The White House. "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." December 1999.

U.S. Department of the Navy. NWP 1-14: The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Norfolk, VA., October 1995.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Operations. (Joint Pub 3-0)
Washington, D.C.: 1 February 1995.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations. (Joint Pub 4-0)
Washington, D.C.: 27 January 1995.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. (Joint Pub 3-07)
Washington D.C.: June 16, 1995.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy of the United States. (Joint Pub 3-0)
Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1995.

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Handbook 24-1, Scott AFB,
Illinois.: October 1, 1998

Vego, Milan. "On Operational Art." Newport: United States Naval War College (4th Draft),
1999.